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I. INTRODUCTION
When Georgia adopted a new evidence code on January 1,
2013, it embraced the rule on scope of cross-examination which
local courts have traditionally followed. This is the wide-open
rule which permits the cross-examiner to range across the entire
case, no matter how limited the direct exam. Subjects foreign to
the direct can be freely explored, limited only by the rule of
relevancy.
A competing rule operates in a majority of states and in
federal courts. On cross-examination, these courts limit the
cross-examiner to the subjects covered on direct, plus credibility
testing. This makes for more orderly and efficient trials, say
proponents of the rule. Better this than the fragmented and
scattered chaos spawned when a cross-examiner runs wild. The
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wide-open rule enables and empowers the over-the-top cross-
examiner, opponents of the rule argue.
Commentators have associated the majority, more limited
cross-examination methodology with American jurisprudence
and the wide-ranging approach with English courts.1 Reflecting
this divide, the Supreme Court of South Dakota recognized
"two principal schools of thought" when it comes to the
appropriate scope of final argument, essentially branding the
debate as between two distinct scholarly camps.2
One hidden aspect of the rules debate is the impact of
constitutional considerations. These surface most dramatically
when a defendant in a criminal case takes the witness stand. In
jurisdictions like Georgia, favoring the English or British rule
and wide-open cross-examination, most defense attorneys stand
back and watch while a prosecutor cross-examines all over the
map. Absent are objections laced with Fifth Amendment
overtones. This Article suggests an innovative approach based
upon the Constitution. When the accused adheres to a narrow
and carefully tailored approach during his direct examination,
he may leave important topics untouched in his testimony. On
these subjects, he has not used the direct to advantage himself,
beyond those matters delved into during his direct.
Accordingly, the argument contends, it is unfair to require him
to address these topics on cross-examination. Indeed, to compel
him to talk on heretofore-unaddressed topics violates the
defendant's privilege against forced self-incrimination.
This is particularly and most extremely the case when it
comes to cross-examination into separate and distinct charges
brought in a criminal indictment concerning which the
1. R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED, J. SEAMAN & E. BEECHER-MONAS,
EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES
60-61 (7th ed. 2012) (identifying "the American view," limiting cross-
examination to the scope of the direct examination, as the majority approach
and the minority favoring wide-open cross-examination as operating in
accord with the "English Rule").
2. State v. Dace, 333 N.W.2d 812, 820 (S.D. 1983) (associating wide-
open cross-examination with McCormick and Wigmore and the American
view with Carlson).
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defendant made no reference. While the defendant did not
participate in the charging decision and faces a burden against
him on a motion to sever offenses, under the British rule he may
be forced to testify about charged offenses outside of his direct
testimony should he elect to take the witness stand in his own
defense. Commentators have referred to this as a "Hobson's
Choice," forcing criminal defendants to choose "between Scylla
of letting charges go unanswered and not testifying and the
Charybdis of being cross-examined about incidents about which
they did not testify." 3
The constitutional problem identified here is discussed in the
context of the Georgia experience because Georgia is the latest
state to pass federal rules, but then to vary the cross-
examination formula. A large handful of other states have done
the same thing. This deviation from federal principles is an
effort by dissenting states to engraft a wide-open cross-
examination policy on the federal pattern. This step introduces
disharmony into evidentiary practice, as will be explained in
Part IV of this Article, infra. It also raises deep constitutional
concerns. Because some other states have used the Georgia
formula, the issues discussed hereafter have broad national
significance. The analysis presented in the following pages
impacts Ohio and Tennessee, for example, because they are
jurisdictions, like Georgia, which have embraced unlimited
cross-examination.
Part II of this Article explores the nature of the privilege
against self-incrimination. Both the federal and the state
patterns are explained. In Part III, the Georgia rule controlling
scope of cross-examination is compared to the rule which
operates in federal courts. The special situation of the accused
as a witness is addressed in Part IV. Decisions from the United
States Supreme Court and other high profile cases which
suggest that the narrow cross-examination rule has a
constitutional basis are revealed. The Article concludes with a
3. RONALD L. CARLSON & MICHAEL SCOTT CARLSON, CARLSON ON
EVIDENCE: COMPARING GEORGIA RULES & FEDERAL RULES 261 (2d ed.
2014).
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plea to the bench and bar to remain observant to the
Constitution when the defendant appears as a witness.
II. NATURE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. Federal Protection: the United States Constitution and the
History of the Right to Silence
When the United States Constitution was proposed to the
states for ratification, there was a furor over the absence of a
Bill of Rights.4 Among other provisions, the First Congress,
which responded to the complaints framed and submitted the
Fifth Amendment. Along with the Sixth Amendment, these
guarantees were intended to remove all obstacles to the ability
of the accused to fully and fairly defend himself against
criminal accusations.5  With the Bill of Rights attached,
ratification of the Constitution of 1789 followed.
The Fifth Amendment provided robust protection to parties
and witnesses in federal trials. The Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination provides that no person in any
criminal case shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.6 For roughly 175 years the protection of the Fifth
Amendment was restricted to federal tribunals. States had their
own provisions. Then in 1964 the United States Supreme Court
held that the privilege contained in federal law was applicable to
the states by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As a result of this development, there was an explosion of
cases involving state procedure which demanded interpretation.
Practices followed in the states raised issues for fresh
interpretation by the United States Supreme Court. In
California, prosecutors had commented freely on the failure of a
defendant to testify in his criminal trial. This approach had
4. Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent
Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REv. 711, 731 (1976).
5. Id. at 738.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964).
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been outlawed in federal practice years earlier.8 The Court
aligned state standards with federal guidelines in Griffin v.
California and reversed the judgment below 9 because "[t]he
prosecutor made much of the failure of the petitioner to
testify.""o
Other cases extended the reach of the Fifth Amendment to
different state practices. In New York, a member of the bar
defied a subpoena for his financial records." In return, he was
disbarred.12 The lawyer claimed that production of the records
or testimony by him would have incriminated him, and he was
privileged to remain silent.13 The United States Supreme Court
agreed.14 The full sweep of the Fifth Amendment had been
absorbed into the Fourteenth, and the Court ruled its protections
extended to lawyers as well as other citizens. 1 "[I]t should not
be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and
the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it." 16
Public employees came under the Court's scrutiny when
police in New Jersey were investigated for fixing traffic
tickets. Before questioning the police, each officer was
warned by the New Jersey Attorney General that refusal to
answer his questions would result in removal from the force. 18
The defendants answered the questions.19 Over their objections,
some of the answers were used in a criminal conspiracy
prosecution against the officers.20 The defendants were
212
convicted,21 but the United States Supreme Court reversed.22
8. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 68 (1893).
9. 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
10. Id. at 610.
11. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 512 (1967).
12. Id. at 513.
13. Id. at 512-13.
14. Id. at 518-19.
15. Id. at 516.
16. Id. at 514.
17. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 494 (1967).
18. Id.
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Applying the Fifth Amendment as it had been construed in prior
federal cases, the approach of New Jersey authorities was held
to be a form of compulsion. 23
While the Supreme Court was extending the constitutional
privilege into corners of state processes previously untouched
by federal intervention, other important interpretations evolved.
What sort of communications did the Fifth Amendment cover?
Did the seizure of a blood sample over a defendant's objection
compel him to be a witness against himself? The decision in
Schmerber v. California24 provided answers. It scanned the
scope and limits of Fifth Amendment protection.
In Schmerber, the blood of an arrestee suspected of drunk
driving was withdrawn by a physician at a hospital, at the
direction of a police officer.25 The sample revealed that the
accused was intoxicated, and the analysis of the blood was
received in evidence at Schmerber's trial.26 He was convicted
27
of driving under the influence, and appealed. Eventually his
case arrived at the United States Supreme Court.28
Nothing in the process of securing blood violated the Fifth
22. Id. at 500.
23. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497. During the period of extension of federal
safeguards into state criminal procedure, other state practices were
invalidated. See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 611-12 (1972) (holding
Tennessee statute unconstitutional when it required an accused who chooses
to testify to take the stand as the first defense witness). Earlier, the
unfettered right of the accused to testify received a boost from the Supreme
Court in Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961). At that time the Georgia
procedure precluded the defendant from giving sworn testimony in his
criminal case. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 570. Although the accused could give
an unsworn statement to the jury, the Court noted the significant potential for
self-incrimination in the accused's statement. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 593;
Clinton, supra note 4, at 760. The exclusion of counsel's participation in
making the unsworn statement unconstitutionally hindered the accused in
presenting his defense. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 593; Clinton, supra note 4, at
760.
24. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
25. Id. at 758.
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Amendment, said the Court.29 Compelling an accused to
provide a physical specimen is different from forcing him to
talk about his crime.30 Compelling testimony from an accused
is barred. Not prohibited is making the suspect the source of
physical evidence. "[Both] federal and state courts have usually
held that [the privilege of silence] offers no protection against
compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or
measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in
court, to stand, to assume a stance, to talk, or to make a
particular gesture." 31
B. Recent Case Applications Enforcing the Right to Silence
The Fifth Amendment continues to be robustly applied in
federal tribunals, both in its application to pretrial proceedings
as well as during trials. Most are familiar with the provisions of
29. Id. at 761.
30. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763-64.
31. Id. at 746. While at the time of Schmerber the majority of states
limited the privilege to testimonial compulsion, a few jurisdictions extended
the sweep of self-incrimination protection to nontestimonial evidence.
Georgia provides one example. See Aldrich v. Georgia, 137 S.E.2d 463,
464-65 (Ga. 1964) (finding truck driver's refusal to obey order to drive truck
on weight scales to check for overload was justified by privilege against self-
incrimination); Calhoun v. State, 87 S.E. 893, 893 (1916) (constitutional
guaranty protects one from being compelled from doing an act against his
will). Prior Maryland law was in accord. Allen v. State, 39 A.2d 820, 824
(Md. 1944) (privilege justified refusal by accused to try on hat found at
crime scene). Modernly, cases have moved closer to the federal pattern and
away from extravagant interpretations of the privilege. For example, taking
the fingerprints of the accused does not violate his privilege against self-
incrimination. See Bell v. State, 597 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ga. 2004)
("[R]equiring a defendant ... to submit to fingerprinting does not violate a
defendant's right against self-incrimination."). Nor does requiring the
accused to participate in a chemical test to determine if he had recently fired
a gun. See English v. State, 216 S.E.2d 851, 853 (Ga. 1975) ("The removal
of traces of substances from his hands is non-testimonial evidence."). See
also State v. Thornton, 322 S.E.2d 711, 712 (Ga. 1984) (dental impressions).
The movement away from extending the privilege to physical acts and
instead focusing on testimonial compulsion is traced in R. CARLSON, TRIAL
HANDBOOK FOR GEORGIA LAWYERS 304-306 (2013) [hereineafter TRIAL
HANDBOOK].
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the Miranda code requiring that a suspect in custody be
apprised of his or her right to remain silent.32 The rule in
Miranda arose out of a concern that the possibility of coercion
inherent in custodial interrogations unacceptably raised the risk
that a suspect's privilege against self-incrimination might be
violated. 33
Fifth Amendment protection has also been a feature of
Georgia case law. Admission of custodial statements was error
in Stone v. State.34 Waiver of Stone's Fifth Amendment rights
was rendered ineffective when police failed to honor his request
for counsel. 3 5  In another case, on-the-scene questioning by
police was at issue. Although officers are allowed to pose
initial inquiries at a crime scene without Miranda warnings
when they are seeking to ascertain the nature of the situation at
hand, they may not turn the exchange into one designed to
establish a particular subject's guilt.36
The need for trial level enforcement of the privilege against
self-incrimination was made evident through federal appellate
review in a 2013 case. A defendant was convicted in Texas of
capital murder and sentenced to death.37  Extraordinarily
extensive comments on the defendant's refusal to testify
resulted in actual prejudice, ruled the United States Court of
Appeals in Gongora v. Thaler.38
At trial, the prosecution portrayed Gongora either as the
shooter or as a participant in a robbery in the course of which
3940Afeththe victim died. 9 Gongora elected not to testify. After the
prosecutor called for the jury to hear from the shooter, Gongora
32. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
33. R. CARLSON & M. CARLSON, supra note 3, at 540 (citing U.S. v.
Pettigrew, 468 F.3d 626 (10th Cir. 2006)).
34. 674 S.E.2d 31, 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
35. Id. at 33.
36. Thompson v. State, 723 S.E.2d 85, 88-89 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
37. Gongora v. Thaler, 710 F.3d 267, 270 (2013).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 273.
277
John Marshall Law Journal [Vol. VII
was convicted.41 The federal appeals court summarized the
damage inflicted by the remarks:
As the district court observed, "the prosecutor remarks on
Gongora's failure to testify were numerous and blatant."
Rather than a single question or incidental statement, the
prosecutor made a series of at least five comments referring
to Gongora's silence as he argued to the jury that Gongora
was the shooter. In the guise of clearing up what his earlier
comments meant, the prosecutor continued to make
comments relating back to the fact that Gongora had not
testified. The judge repeatedly cautioned the prosecutor, yet
the prosecutor further highlighted the reference by persisting
in his train of "who you would expect to hear from"
argument. This factor weighs against a finding that the error
was harmless.42
What about the fact that the judge told the jury to disregard
some of the prosecution's comments? The appellate court
described the trial judge's curative instructions as "perfunctory
and devoid of specificity." 4 3  The ineffectiveness of the
instructions contributed to the reviewing court's decision, which
vacated Gongora's conviction on Fifth Amendment grounds. 4 4
Application of the Fifth Amendment at trial continues in both
federal and state courts. In fact, federal and Georgia practice
have taken similar paths when it comes to forbidding a
prosecutor from eliciting testimony that a defendant had
invoked his right to silence after receiving Miranda warnings,
which was the subject of Doyle v. Ohio.4 5 As recently as 2014,
running afoul of this mandate has been referred to as a "Doyle
violation." 46 In a 2012 decision, the Court of Appeals of South
41. Id. at 272.
42. Id. at 278-79.
43. Id. at 280.
44. Id. at 283.
45. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Cases referring to Doyle in this context include
Jones v. Bagley, 696 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2012) and Black v. State, 410 S.E.2d
740 (Ga. 1991).
46. U.S. v. Reeves, 742 F.3d 487, 504 (11th Cir. 2014) (referring to a
"Doyle violation"). See also Wallace v. State, 273 S.E.2d 143, 145-46 (Ga.
1980) (addressing whether "the state impermissibly commented on [the
defendant's] post-arrest silence in violation of Doyle v. Ohio," referring to
278
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Carolina reversed a defendant's convictions for repeated Doyle
violations committed by the prosecution. 47
C. Georgia State Law
1. Constitutional Protection
The Georgia Constitution provides: "No person shall be
compelled to give testimony tending in any manner to be self-
incriminating."48 The Georgia privilege is highly protective of
defendant rights, providing broader coverage than the
comparable federal provision.49  However, while Georgia
supplies wide privilege protection, the law requires the passive
cooperation of a suspect who is being photographed,
fingerprinted, submitting to a breath test, removing a hair
- --50
sample, or providing a voice exemplar.
2. Georgia Rules ofEvidence Which Protect the Right to
Silence
Prior to 2013, Georgia operated under an evidence code
penned by a single author. Georgia's original code of evidence
was adopted in 1863. It was written by General Thomas R. R.
Cobb. Cobb's code was advanced at a time when the Civil War
was raging, and it controlled evidentiary practice in Georgia for
such violation as a "Doyle violation").
47. South Carolina v. Williams, 731 S.E.2d 338, 341-42 (S.C. Ct. App.
2012).
48. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 16.
49. P. MILICH, GEORGIA RULES OF EVIDENCE 943 (2013). See Butler v.
State, 625 S.E.2d 458, 461 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted):
[T]he Georgia Constitution accords broader rights than the United
States Constitution in that the Georgia constitutional guarantee
against self-incrimination 'protects one from being compelled to
furnish evidence against himself, either in the form of oral
confessions or incriminating admissions of an involuntary character,
or of doing an act against his will which is incriminating in its
nature.'
50. MILICH, supra note 49, at 942-43. Note the similarities to the
approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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51the next 150 years.
After struggling with the old code for many years, legislators
and bar leaders became restive, and in the 1980s a movement to
new rules began. It was not easy. Fully 22 years of debate and
discussion was expended as the Georgia rules were shaped.
Finally, a set of provisions based upon the Federal Rules of
Evidence was enacted with an effective date of January 1,
2013. 52
By enacting its new evidence code, Georgia followed a long
list of jurisdictions which modernized their evidence laws by
adopting, in large measure, the Federal Rules of Evidence.53
One of those federal rules is Rule 104(d), Federal Rules of
Evidence. As will become apparent shortly, that rule will bear
heavily upon the analysis contained in this Article.
The privilege rules embraced in chapter 5 of the new Georgia
evidence code largely repeat former statutes. There is O.C.G.A.
§ 24-5-505, which accords witnesses and parties the right to
- - - -54
remain silent in the face of incriminating questions. The
special situation of an accused person is recognized in O.C.G.A.
§ 24-5-506. The code provides that "[n]o person who is
charged in any criminal proceeding with the commission of any
criminal offense shall be compellable to give evidence for or
against himself."56 Another code provision that protects Fifth
Amendment rights of criminal defendants appears at O.C.G.A. §
24-8-824 that states: "To make a confession admissible, it shall
have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another
51. See W. Wilson & R. Carlson, The Best Evidence Rule Made Better: A
Glimpse into Georgia's New Evidence Code, 19 GA. B.J. 12, 12 (2013)
(describing the origin of Georgia's original evidence code); see also E.
Surrency, The Georgia Code of 1863 and Its Place in the Codification
Movement, 11 J. S. LEGAL HIST. 81, 90 (2003) (detailing the history of
Georgia's prior code of evidence).
52. W. Wilson & R. Carlson, supra note 51, at 12-13.
53. R. CARLSON & M. CARLSON, supra note 3, at xx.
54. O.C.G.A. § 24-5-505 (West, Westlaw through 2014).
55. O.C.G.A. § 24-5-506 (West, Westlaw through 2014).
5 6. Id.
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by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.", 7
The foregoing provisions repeat former Georgia statutes.
However, O.C.G.A. § 24-1-104(d) is new for Georgia.
Like its federal counterpart, Georgia code provision
O.C.G.A. § 24-1-104 deals with preliminary matters and the
function of the judge. When the court hears testimony from an
accused person testifying in support of a motion to suppress, the
prosecutor may not use the opportunity to expose the defendant
to a thorough and sifting cross-examination on the entire case.
Barred, upon objection, are questions bearing on aspects of the
case which are unrelated to suppression issues. The scope of
cross-examination is controlled by the subjects introduced by
the accused on direct. O.C.G.A. § 24-1-104(d) provides: "The
accused shall not, by testifying upon a preliminary matter,
become subject to cross-examination as to other issues in the
proceeding." 58
Of course, the prosecutor may test the accused with inquiries
related to the voluntariness of a confession, for example, if the
defendant's pretrial testimony attacked voluntariness. To range
widely over other issues in the case like those related to guilt or
innocence is forbidden. This limitation upon cross-examination
is designed to encourage participation by the accused in the
determination of preliminary matters.59
This pretrial rule seems in accord with the defendant's
constitutional right to silence. The defendant lays himself open
to cross-examination on the subjects of his direct examination,
but no further. The privilege against self-incrimination has been
waived on those subjects, but no other. The practice of wide-
open cross-examination has no place when a prosecutor is
cross-examining the accused.
57. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-824 (West, Westlaw through 2014).
58. O.C.G.A. § 24-1-104(d) (West, Westlaw through 2014)
59. FED. R. EVID. 104(d) advisory committee's note. Also inducing
testimony from the defendant is the companion rule; that testimony by a
defendant at a hearing to exclude evidence is generally not admissible at his
subsequent trial to prove guilt. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,
389-90 (1968); Culpepper v. State, 209 S.E.2d 18, 734 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974);
MILICH, supra note 49, at 953.
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That same reasoning would seem fully applicable when the
accused appears as a trial witness. While some Georgia
jurisprudence at first blush seems to cast doubt upon that
conclusion, most of those cases never considered the
constitutional dimensions of the controversy.60 In the face of a
serious constitutional challenge, repetition by counsel of a
simple maxim like "thorough and sifting cross-examination"
appears woefully inadequate.
D. Military Patterns
In an outstanding illustration of code drafting, Military Rule
of Evidence 301 spells out provisions applicable when an
accused testifies in a court martial.61 The armed forces
regulations are a model for others to follow. While in other
respects the federal evidence rules are followed in military
tribunals, Military Rule of Evidence 301 is special. Here is
what it says when an accused testifies against criminal charges:
Rule 301. Privilege concerning compulsory self-
incrimination
(c) Limited Waiver: An accused who chooses to testify as a
witness waives the privilege against self-incrimination only
with respect to the matters concerning which he or she
testifies. If the accused is on trial for two of more offenses
and on direct examination testifies about only one or some of
the offenses, the accused may not be cross-examined as to
guilt or innocence with respect to the other offenses unless
the cross-examination is relevant to an offense concerning
which the accused has testified. This waiver is subject to
Mil. R. Evid. 608(b).62
60. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 202 S.E.2d 433, 435 (Ga. 1973) ("[Th]e
defendant . . . could have made an unsworn statement without cross
examination or he could have testified under oath and subjected himself to a
thorough and sifting cross examination but there is no procedure permitting a
defendant to testify under oath on a limited subject without subjecting
himself to cross examination.").
61. MIL. R. EVID. 301.
62. Id. at (c).
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III. RULES OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
A. Federal Rule Drafts: Drafting Federal Evidence Rule
611(b) and the Narrow Rule of Cross-Examination
Debates marked the inclusion of the limited rule of cross-
examination when the Federal Rules of Evidence were
originally drafted. Proponents of the American or federal rule
relied upon precedents which praised the narrow rule as "a
valuable rule of practice, and one well-calculated to promote
regularity and logical order in jury trials." 63 In the run-up to the
passage of the federal rules, competing drafts embraced the
wide-open rule at one point in the process, and the federal rule
at another point. Ultimately, the narrow or American rule was
adopted by the House and carried the day with Congress. 64 The
result was Federal Rule of Evidence 611(b).
The policies underlying Congress's decision were considered
in a decision from United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania:
Rule 611(b) limits the scope of cross-examination "to the
subject matter of direct examination and matters affecting
63. Wills v. Russell, 100 U.S. 621, 626 (1879).
64. The history of the dispute and the debate over the federal rule is traced
in Ronald L. Carlson, Scope of Cross-Examination and the Proposed
Federal Rules, 32 FED. B.J. 244 (1973). Strong policies support the federal
view, as evidenced by its enactment in a majority of states as well as its
application in military trials. The Military Rules of Evidence follow the
federal rules, including the provision on narrow scope of cross-examination.
MIL. R. EVID. 611(b). The reasons are noted in Francis Gilligan & Frederic
Lederer, The Procurement and Presentation of Evidence in Courts-Martial:
Compulsory Process and Confrontation, 101 MIL. L. REV. 1, 57 (1983)
("Close adherence to a fixed standard may limit the usefulness of the cross-
examination, but the dangers of undue prejudice and excessive consumption
of time clearly lurk in the background"). The Military Rules of Evidence
take a decisive view on the defendant's right to split his or her self-
incrimination protection at trial in MIL. R. EVID. 301(c), saying the accused
may not be cross-examined about issues not raised in the defendant's
testimony; see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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credibility of the witness . . ." Fed. R. Evid. 611(b). In
enacting Rule 611, Congress endorsed the practice "that an
unfolding of the facts in an orderly fashion usually will save
time and promote the truth." 28 Charles A. Wright and
Victor J. Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence §
6162, at 341 (1993) (footnote omitted). As a leading
commentator has observed, "by limiting cross-examination
to the subject matter of direct, subdivision (b) [of Rule 6111
precludes the cross-examiner from creating diversions and
digressions into different topics that may confuse or
otherwise unfairly prejudice the jury." Id. 6165, at 393.
"[Al Court has a duty to exercise its powers under Rule 611
where there is no need for the evidence offered or where the
only point of an examination is to gain partisan advantage by
intimidating the witness or prejudicing the jury against him."
Id. § 6162, at 343.
The rules of cross-examination apply to witnesses who are
called in civil cases, as well as government witnesses in
criminal cases. As to these sorts of witnesses, a jurisdiction is
free to adopt its own format for scope of cross-examination.
The same goes for defense witnesses other than the accused.
An election to adopt a wide-open or "thorough and sifting"
cross-examination is not a subject for general federal
intervention. Nor is adoption of the American rule. Under it,
when a defense or a government witness is examined, the cross-
66
examination can be controlled. A recent case from the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals demonstrates that federal courts are
more than willing to restrict a party's-even a criminal
defendant's-attempts to swing wildly during cross-
examination, even going so far as to demand evidence from the
65. U.S. v. Carter, 966 F. Supp. 336, 351-52 (E.D. Pa. 1997). Under both
the federal as well as the English pattern, traditional forms of credibility
impeachment like bias, prior convictions or inconsistent statements can be
used on cross-examination.
66. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) ("[T]he
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-
examination . . . not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and
to whatever extent the defense might wish."); New Mexico v. Smith, 19 P.3d
254, 262-63 (N.M. 2001) (finding no constitutional deprivation in limiting
cross-examination to the scope of direct testimony).
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defense prior to authorizing certain subjects during cross-
examination:
We have previously recognized that a defendant cannot
distract the jury by introducing evidence concerning a
potential defense that he never raised. Relevance, after all,
must "be determined in relation to the charges and claims
being tried, rather than in the context of defenses which
might have been raised but were not." If the defendant
wants to present a theory or belief that might have justified
his actions, then he must present evidence that he in fact
relied on that theory or belief. Otherwise, a defendant could
introduce evidence that would invite the jury to speculate a
non-existent defense into existence.
B. Is the Topic Reasonably Related to the Direct?
A cross-examiner under the federal rule is not strictly limited
to the exact questions asked by the direct examiner. Rather, any
subject opened up on direct is eligible for exploration. The test
is whether the cross-examination question addresses a topic
which is reasonably related to the direct. 6 8
This may lead critics of the theory advanced in this Article to
urge that the narrow scope rule can be simply evaded by use of
the excuse that "this is all reasonably related to the direct." Can
an unrelated topic be readily explored by a cross-examiner
under the ploy that it is "reasonably related?" It is the
responsibility of the trial judge to see that disjointed topics are
not injected willy-nilly into the cross-examination. The antidote
for manipulation of the process is adherence to the terms and
purposes of Rule 611(b), as well as appropriate judicial
oversight. Insuring that the subjects introduced during cross
have a nexus to the direct is a judicial responsibility. 69
67. U.S. v. Zayyad, 741 F.3d 452, 460 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal citations
omitted).
68. Macauly v. Anas, 321 F.3d 45, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2003).
69. See generally U.S. v. Caracappa, 614 F.3d 30, 42-43 (2d Cir. 2010)
(granting broad discretion to the trial court to determine whether issues on
direct and cross are reasonably related).
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C. Georgia Law and Practice
1. History of the Rule of "Thorough and Sifting Cross-
Examination"
The rule assuring a thorough and sifting cross-examination
has a long history in Georgia statutory law. Statutes prior to the
2013 Georgia Code of Evidence provided: "The right of a
thorough and sifting cross-examination shall belong to every
party as to the witnesses called against the party."7 0 This statute
dates back to Cobb's Code in 1863 and was maintained in
Georgia's 2013 evidence code.n Absent from reports about the
passage of Georgia Rule 611(b) seems to be any comments
reflecting Fifth Amendment considerations similar to those
raised in this Article. 7 2
They are important. In consideration of them, the Military
Rules of Evidence incorporated a special evidence rule referred
to earlier, Mil. R. Evid. 301(c). Why the need for that rule?
Commentators answer the inquiry:
Read together, Rules 611(b), 301 and 608(b) appear to take a
restrictive approach toward cross-examination of an accused.
This authority allows the accused to testify about only one of
several specifications, limit cross-examination to only those
matters covered on direct, to take the stand concerning any
issue not dealing directly with guilt or innocence and to
retain the privilege against self-incrimination. The Rules
appear to be intended to encourage the accused to testify
70. The 2013 law repeats this language. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-611(b) (West,
Westlaw through 2014).
71. David N. Dreyer et. al., Dancing with the Big Boys: Georgia Adopts
(Most oj) the Federal Rules of Evidence, 63 MERCER L. REV. 1, 36-37
(2011).
72. Commentary identified with the adoption of Georgia's 2013 evidence
code makes no mention of debate concerning constitutional implications of
Rule 611(b). See Paul S. Milich, Georgia's New Evidence Code-an
Overview, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 379, 384 (2012); Dreyer et. al., supra note
71; Daniel Hendrix et. al., Evidence, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2010).
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without impairing the government's ability to ask questions
about the part of the case that the accused opens up.
While Federal Evidence Rule 611(b) did not specifically
address the extent of waiver of the Fifth Amendment, it was on
the mind of the federal drafting committee. The archival notes
of committee member Thomas F. Green relate to Federal
Evidence Rule 611 and reflect these concerns: "At the May,
1967 meeting [of the Federal Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules] further questions were raised as to the extent of waiver
by an accused who elects to testify on only one count of a
multiple count indictment . . . Professor Green then provides
these remarkable and perceptive comments:
The Reporter has not included in the present draft any
provision relating to the extent of the waiver by an accused
who testifies [at trial]. The decision of the Committee
against "wide open" cross-examination greatly diminishes
the need for the provision and perhaps eliminates it entirely.
The problem of the accused who wishes to testify on only
one count of a multiple-count indictment appears to be as
was suggested during the discussion in the first instance a
problem of severance under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and perhaps in final analysis one of the
* 75constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
Professor Green, the author of Green 's Georgia Law of
Evidence, displayed great insight when he concluded that the
question of scope of cross-examination of an accused is, in the
final analysis, "one of the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination." 7 6 As will be explained in Part IV of this Article,
73. S. SALTZBURG, L. SCHINASI, & D. SCHLUETER, MILITARY RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL 688 (1991). Note that the above comment comes from
the 1991 version of the Saltzburg, Schinasi and Schlueter text. A quote from
the 2011 edition of the same work appears later in this Article. See infra
note 155 and accompanying text.
74. Thomas Green, Federal Advisory Committee on Evidence
Memorandum v.16-19, Memorandum No. 18, Second Draft, Rule 611 and
Scope of Cross-Examination 25 (May 1967) (original housed in the
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the matter of severance is not so easily handled.
Georgia's wide-open cross-examination rule has been applied
to countless cases. Ordinary witnesses in civil and criminal
cases are faced with sweeping cross-examination and
prosecutors in criminal cases also possess this statutory right.7 8
However, when applied against a criminal defendant who
narrowly tailors his direct examination, difficult constitutional
considerations emerge. These considerations appeared in a
recent passage from an evidence treatise:
In a future case, a defense attorney may raise the issue. The
argument would be that during the direct examination of the
accused, only certain distinct counts of a charging instrument
were addressed. On others, the accused did not open up the
topic. Accordingly, this argument would advance that
allowing prosecutorial cross-examination on subjects not
addressed by the accused would abridge her/his Fifth
Amendment rights. This could particularly see light in an
indictment covering numerous incidents and a wide-array of
dates and parties.79
2. Current Applications: Georgia Evidence Decisions
There are conflicting indications in Georgia jurisprudence
respecting the nature and extent of allowable cross-examination
when an accused testifies. Most cases declare wide-open cross-
examination, without giving any consideration to constitutional
issues. A 1982 decision in this camp is summarized by one
commentator: "A defendant cannot testify before the jury on
the limited issue of the voluntariness of his confession and
thereby restrict the state to that issue on cross-examination."80
77. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 744 S.E.2d 349, 352 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)
(finding the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecutor to conduct a
thorough and sifting cross-exam of the defense's expert witness).
78. Richardson v. State, 699 S.E.2d 595, 598 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) ("The
State, like any other party, has the right to conduct a thorough and sifting
cross-examination and to pursue the specifics of a topic the defendant
introduced.") (citations omitted).
79. R. CARLSON & M. CARLSON, supra note 3, at 262
80. MILICH, supra note 49, at 955 (citing Gaskins v. State, 297 S.E.2d 729
(Ga. 1982).
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On the other hand, contrary indications have surfaced in
recent decisional law. A 2012 case announces: "In Georgia, 'a
party, though introduced as a witness in his own behalf, may,
upon cross-examination as to matters not voluntarily testified
about on his direct examination, decline to give testimony
which would tend to incriminate him."' 81 The Court of Appeals
of Georgia supported the right of an accused at trial to refuse to
testify about similar transaction evidence. 82  "Thus,
[defendant's] waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights as to the
charge in this case would not have automatically resulted in a
waiver of his right to remain silent in connection with the
similar transaction." 83
This approach is in keeping with the modem trend allowing
partial waiver of Fifth Amendment rights. Old Georgia law
declared that when a defendant voluntarily takes the stand and
I IV 1 184testifies, his waiver is not partial. His offer of testimony "is a
waiver as to all . . . relevant facts." 85
IV. THE ACCUSED As A WITNESS
A. An Emerging Constitutional Crisis: the Accused Who
Testifies Narrowly but is Cross-Examined Broadly and Without
Limit
Case law and court decisions have firmly established that the
accused is a competent witness on his own behalf. How
regularly does this occur? The frequency of testimony by the
accused in criminal cases has been the object of discussion.
Clearly, the defendant's criminal record, or lack thereof, drives
81. Whitman v. State, 729 S.E.2d 409, 412 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (citations
omitted).
82. Id. The charge supporting the similar transaction was pending against
Whitman during his trial on the main charge.
83. Id. at 413. For a similar approach, see People v. Betts, 514 N.E.2d
865 (N.Y. 1987).
84. Whitman, 729 S.E.2d at 412 (citing three prior Georgia cases).
85. Carter v. State, 288 S.E.2d 749, 751 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (citation
omitted).
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the process in many cases.86 The nature of the offense can
provide an important variable. Child sexual molestation
charges often prompt defense attorneys to encourage an
appearance by the accused. The impact and overtones of such
an accusation are on their face so prejudicial that it demands a
defendant's response, many say.
The important issue identified in this Article may well arise
in a future case where at least two distinct counts are contained
in an indictment. Suppose the accused takes the stand and
testifies respecting count one, which alleges a crime was
committed in Atlanta by the accused on April 1, 2014. The
second count alleges a similar sort of crime by the accused on
June 12, 2014. The second crime involves a totally separate set
of facts. In his testimony, the accused addresses only the April
1 allegation. He points out that he was overseas and not in
Atlanta on April 1, so he could not be guilty. Nothing is said by
him about the June allegations. Here is the way the prosecutor's
cross-examination might begin, following current law. "Mr.
Defendant, for the moment let's forget about April 1. I am
going to ask you all about the June 12 incident." At this point
an objection based on constitutional grounds is sorely needed.
Such an objection is rarely heard. However, in a future
prosecution we can expect some perceptive defense attorney to
raise it.
When that happens, a crucial collision will occur between
traditional Georgia practice and the United States Constitution.
Whether the objection will be successful depends mightily on
the presence of prior cases which indicate that the narrow rule
of cross-examination is constitutionally required. Are there
86. Jeffrey Bellin, Is Punishment Relevant After All? A Prescription for
Informing Juries of the Consequences of Conviction, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2223,
2258-59 (2010):
When the defendant takes the witness stand, the prosecution can
vigorously cross-examine him and introduce, for impeachment, the
defendant's criminal record. In cases where these (and other)
disadvantages outweigh the benefits of testifying, it may be tactically
disadvantageous for a defendant to testify simply to voice a
subjective, ex ante awareness of the applicable punishment.
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such decisions? The next section of this Article explores the
question of whether there are respected courts which have found
constitutional mandates supporting the narrow rule.
Merging with the law of partial waiver of Fifth Amendment
rights is a related constitutional concept, the constitutional right
to present a defense.87 Does the threat of unlimited cross-
examination sometimes keep defendants off the witness stand?
Combined with Fifth Amendment concerns, these doctrines
raise potent constitutional questions.
B. Defendant's Right to Testify Free from Cross-Examination
on Unexplored Topics: Tailoring the Direct
1. Defendant's Right to Partially Waive His Right to Silence
a. Federal History
Left open in the last section of this Article was a most
important question. Can there be a constitutional violation
when a prosecutor engages in wide-open cross-examination of
the accused? The best case to commence this discussion is
Tucker v. United States.88 On facts eerily similar to the
hypothetical posed in the prior section of this Article, the
defendant in a mail fraud case directed his attention to one issue
in the case, the existence of a fraudulent scheme, when he gave
his direct.89 He denied such a scheme existed.90 When the
prosecutor took over on cross-examination, he began asking
about an issue foreign to the direct, albeit relevant to the
87. Sarauer v. Frank, No. 05-C-0057-C, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8549, at
*28-33 (W.D. Wis. 2005); Clinton, supra note 4, at 757 (citing Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961)). See R. Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right to
Present Witnesses, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1063, 1075, 1094 (1999) (discussing
the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the right to present witnesses).
88. 5 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1925). The Tucker case accorded the narrow rule
of cross-examination constitutional status, as observed in W.H. Faulk, Jr.,
Note, Is the Restricted Cross-Examination Rule Embodied in the Fifth
Amendment?, 45 N.C. L. REV. 1030, 1031-32 n.11 (1967).
89. Tucker, 5 F.2d at 822.
90. Id.
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91crime. There was an objection, but the trial judge required the
witness to answer.92 This resulted in reversible error based on
constitutional grounds.93  "In eliciting the answers to the
questions propounded to Dudley Tucker with reference to [one
aspect of the crime], the government made Dudley Tucker its
witness, and compelled him over [r]easonable and proper
objection to be a witness against himself, in violation of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution." 94
The Tucker court added that "' [i]f there is a good reason why
a defendant should not be compelled to be a witness against
himself, there ought to be equally good reason why, if he has
testified voluntarily upon one issue, he should not be compelled
to testify against his will concerning matters wholly unrelated to
that issue . . ."95 Other, later cases added force to the conclusion
that constitutional imperatives dictated the restrictive rule of
cross-examination when the accused takes the stand. A note to
United States v. Guajardo-Melendez remarks that earlier court
decisions "as well as the writings of commentators, e.g.,
Carlson, Cross Examination of the Accused, 52 CORNELL L.Q.
705 (1967), seem to embrace the doctrine of partial waiver of
[F]ifth [A]mendment rights." 96  Decisions of similar nature97
prompted one commentator to conclude: "The constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination and the statute of 1878
permitting the defendant to testify have been construed as
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 824.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 822.
96. 401 F.2d 35, 38 n.5 (7th Cir. 1968).
97. See, e.g., Harrold v. Oklahoma, 169 F. 47, 51 (8th Cir. 1909) (noting
the accused "waives his privilege of silence upon the subjects relative to
which he testifies, but upon no other."); Wilson v. U.S., 4 F.2d 888, 889 (8th
Cir. 1925) (finding cross-examination where the defendant was required to
testify to facts outside of the direct examination relating to other counts was
"inexcusable upon any ground consistent with the rules that a defendant is
entitled to a fair trial, and that he may not be compelled to be a witness
against himself")
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requiring a restrictive cross-examination."98
The Seventh Circuit United States Court of Appeals has
asserted that when a defendant takes the stand, he waives the
privilege against self-incrimination to the extent of his direct
testimony. 99  Supreme Court decisions were cited which
supported the conclusion.100  There is even Georgia authority
which seems to obliquely recognize this principle: "A
defendant who testifies on his own behalf waives his privilege
against self-incrimination to the extent of that testimony."10
Conclusions from these case-based declarations indicate that the
defendant waives the privilege of silence to the extent of topics
covered in his direct testimony, but not beyond. 102
b. Recent Federal Case Law
In addition to the federal and United States Supreme Court
cases cited in the last section of this Article, do other recent
federal decisions clarify the controversy? A 2005 federal
decision from Wisconsin aids this inquiry.103 In a battery case,
the defendant claimed photographs of the crime scene would
98. Orfield, Examination of Witnesses in Federal Cases, 4 ARIZ. L. REV.
215, 240 (1962).
99. U.S. ex rel. Irwin v. Pate, 357 F.2d 911, 915-16 (7th Cir. 1966).
100. Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900); Brown v.
United States, 356 U.S. 148, 157-58 (1958). A comprehensive analysis of
these Supreme Court cases appears in Ronald L. Carlson, Cross-Examination
of the Accused, 52 CORNELL L. REV. 705 (1967).
101. Edison v. State, 344 S.E.2d 231, 233 (Ga. 1986) (emphasis added),
referenced in MILICH, supra note 49, at 952. See Reedman v. State, 593
S.E.2d 46, 53 (2003) ("[T]he trial court properly informed [defendant] that a
defendant who takes the stand and testifies in his own behalf waives the right
to remain silent to the extent of that testimony."). As noted elsewhere in this
Article, other Georgia cases have been less attentive to the constitutional
dimensions of the scope of cross-examination rules.
102. Harrold, 169 F. at 51. The line of Supreme Court cases analyzing
the Fifth Amendment issue has not always been smooth and consistent.
Against cases like Fitzpatrick cited above are decisions in cases like Johnson
v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943) and Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S.
494 (1926).
103. Sarauer v. Frank, No. 05-C-0057-C, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8549
(W.D. Wis. 2005).
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support his defense.104 However, the trial judge conditioned the
introduction of the pictures on the defendant taking the stand.10 5
The judge further required him to testify and be cross-examined
"on all aspects of the case." 10 6 The accused did not testify. 107
The photos were never introduced.108 After the defendant was
convicted, he claimed he was deprived of his constitutional right
to present evidence.109 He was foreclosed from the opportunity
to offer the photographs by the trial court's requirement that he
submit to an unlimited cross-examination. "10
The federal court addressed the issue of abridgment of Fifth
Amendment rights created by the evidentiary ruling imposed
during defendant's trial. Conditioning direct testimony on
the requirement of unlimited cross-examination was potentially
unconstitutional, the decision concluded.112 Referencing United
States Supreme Court, federal circuit and state authority, the
court added:
The federal rule is that a defendant who takes the stand
waives his privilege against self-incrimination only as to
matters "reasonably related" to his direct testimony. See
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215, 91 S. Ct. 1454,
28 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1971) (defendant who takes stand in his
own behalf cannot then claim privilege against cross-
examination "on matters reasonably related to the subject
matter of his direct examination") (emphasis added); Brown
v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-55, 78 S. Ct. 622, 2 L.
Ed. 2d 589 (1958) (breadth of defendant's waiver of
privilege against self-incrimination determined by scope of
relevant cross-examination). See also Neely v. Israel, 715 F.
2d 1261, 1265 (7th Cir. 1983) (declining to reach
constitutionality of Wisconsin's wide open cross rule in light
of court's conclusion that cross-examination was properly





109. Sarauer, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8549, at * 8-9.
110. Id. at *28.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *29-30.
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within scope of direct). It is unclear whether this rule is
rooted in the language of the Fifth Amendment or is a
procedural rule that does not bind the states. See Neely v.
State, 97 Wis. 2d 38, 44-45, 292 N.W.2d 859 (1980)
(discussing history of federal rule).113
c. Action In Other States
An excellent decision by the Supreme Court of Kansas sheds
light on the extent of the waiver accomplished when the accused
ascends the witness stand.114 The setting was a Jackson v.
Denno hearing. The accused testified on his own behalf and
against the voluntariness of his confession. 1 1 6  Instead of
sticking with the voluntariness issue, the prosecutor's cross-
examination ranged over various aspects of the case.
Questions were asked which related to the merits of the dispute
and matters of defense.H8 Allowing such inquiries over
objection was an error of constitutional dimensions. When the
defendant refused to answer some of them, the defendant's
testimony was stricken and he was held in contempt.119 The
Kansas Supreme Court made short work of the state's claim that
by testifying the defendant had exposed himself to a wide-open
cross-examination:
At a Jackson v. Denno hearing, the issue before the trial
court is whether the defendant's statement or confession was
voluntary. The truthfulness of the statement is not at issue.
The defendant may take the stand for the limited purpose of
testifying about the events related to whether the statement
was voluntarily made. Questions that go to the substance of
the statements are outside the scope of a Jackson v. Denno
hearing. Here, the trial court erred in ruling that [defendant]
must answer questions about the events that were the bases
113. Id. at *30. The court ruled that "[e]ven assuming the trial court's
error was of constitutional magnitude," Sarauer was unable to show the error
was prejudicial. Id. at *31.
114. State v. Bogguess, 288 P.3d 481, 486 (Kan. 2012).
115. Id.
116. Id.
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for the crimes charged. The trial court further erred in
striking all of [defendant's] testimony because [defendant]
had a valid Fifth Amendment privilege.120
Until this case, Kansas had not weighed in directly on the
issue of whether a defendant could testify at a Jackson v. Denno
hearing without waiving his or her Fifth Amendment rights. In
deciding for the accused, the court relied upon Texas and
Georgia law:
Texas is not the only state to limit cross-examination during
a Jackson v. Denno hearing to determine the issue of
voluntariness. While not ruling on an identical situation, the
Georgia Supreme Court clearly implied that the cross-
examination of the defendant during a Jackson v. Denno
hearing should be limited to the issue of voluntariness.
Marshall v. State, 266 Ga. 304, 305-06, 466 S.E.2d 567
(1996). 121
Some may argue that the partial waiver accomplished by the
accused at a Jackson v. Denno hearing, a view espoused by
virtually all courts which have looked at the issue, does not
carry over to trial. Yet no reasoning has been offered to support
this claim. The counter-argument is that if partial waiver is
good at a suppression hearing, it is also good at trial. At the
suppression hearing, the accused's direct addresses
voluntariness in confession cases, and the cross-examiner is
restricted to voluntariness. That is as far as the defendant has
120. Bogguess, 288 P.3d at 488.
121. Id. at 487. See State v. Lovett, 345 So. 2d 1139, 1145 (La. 1977)
(finding testimony at trial by defendant against the voluntariness of his
confession should be limited to the issue of voluntariness and cross-
examination at trial is necessarily limited to that narrow issue). The Lovett
decision did not arise out of a pretrial proceeding. The accused attacked his
confession at trial. Lovett, 345 So. 2d at 1144-45. As noted, the reviewing
court narrowed the scope of cross-examination of the accused at trial.
Lovett, 345 So. 2d at 1144-45. The case is commented upon in Stephen H.
Vogt, Note, Defendant- Witnesses, Confessions, and a Limited Scope of
Cross-Examination, 38 LA. L. REV. 890, 897 (1978) (explaining the United
States Supreme Court, in a constitutional case "which made the right against
self-incrimination applicable to the states, also may oblige the states to
follow the narrow rule of cross-examination . . .").
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waived his rights.122 In similar fashion, at trial the defendant
has only waived his rights to subjects he testified about on
direct.
Courts in states that adopted the American approach have
voiced constitutional concerns related to with wide-open cross-
examination, even where the issue is not particularly raised. 123
Even adherents of the British rule appear to concede-both
directly and by deviating from its strictures-that its application
raises numerous concerns. While declining to resolve the issue
of whether its wide-open cross-examination rule effectuated a
violation of Fifth Amendment rights, for instance, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin noted that the adoption of a more restrictive
scope of cross-examination by federal courts essentially
obviated those concerns.124
Even in wide-open states, deviations from the British rule of
cross-examination abounds. The Supreme Court of Vermont,
for example, held on state due process grounds, that,
notwithstanding the terms of its code section, previously
suppressed evidence should be unavailable to the State for
impeachment purposes.125 The only exception would be when it
is clear that the defendant has testified during direct
examination in a manner contradictory to the suppressed
122. FED. R. EVID. 104(d).
123. People v. Raffaelli, 647 P.2d 230, 233 n.7 (Colo. 1982). The
Raffaelli court references J. Weinstein & M. Berger as well as R. Carlson
and observes: "Cross-examination of a defendant concerning particular
matters not raised by direct examination, such as the content of the
defendant's confession, may implicate the defendant's privilege against self
incrimination. However, that privilege was not claimed here, and, therefore,
we do not consider the issue in this case." Id. (citation omitted).
124. Neely v. State, 292 N.W.2d 859, 864 (Wis. 1980) ("[T]he question of
the extent of the waiver by testifying rarely arose because the rule limiting
the scope of permissible cross-examination would bar questions about
matters not brought out on direct without reference to whether the defendant
had waived his privilege against self-incrimination by testifying."). An
earlier case from Washington directly took the position that the privilege
against self-incrimination was violated when an accused was compelled to
testify on cross-examination regarding a matter not touched on during the
examination in chief. State v. Crowder, 205 P. 850, 852 (Wash. 1922).
125. State v. Brunelle, 534 A.2d 198, 203 (Vt. 1987).
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evidence:
We believe, in line with our discussion above, that V.R.E.
611(b) must be limited where the prosecution seeks to
impeach a criminal defendant by the use of suppressed
evidence bearing directly on the crime charged. Cross-
examination, normally limited under Rule 611(b) only by
materiality, is hereafter restricted for prosecutors who cross-
examine a criminal defendant. Only where a defendant has
testified on direct examination to facts contradicted by
previously suppressed evidence bearing directly on the crime
charged may the prosecution use such evidence to impeach
the defendant on cross-examination. With respect to
collateral matters, however, where defendant testifies on
direct or cross-examination to facts not bearing directly on
the crime for which he or she is on trial, it remains within the
discretion of the trial court whether suppressed evidence that
relates only to such collateral matters, and not to the crime
charged, may be admitted for impeachment purposes.126
There are some state-by-state variations within the wide-open
jurisdictions. Some adopt a mixed pattern. Missouri follows
the English rule, but wisely embraces the federal rule when a
criminal defendant is examined.127 Kentucky favors the English
rule generally, but allows the trial judge to limit cross-
examination regarding matters not testified about on direct
examination.128 New York courts have held that "a testifying
defendant does not automatically waive the privilege against
126. Id. at 203-04:
We believe this rule will achieve a fair balance between defendant's
right to testify on his or her own behalf and the State's interest in
preventing perjury. To permit the use of suppressed evidence to
impeach testimony first brought out on cross-examination would
upset this balance and impose an untenable chilling effect on
defendant's right to testify ...
127. State v. Gardner, 8 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Mo. 2000).
128. KY. R. Ev. 611(b). See Richard H. Underwood, Book Review,
Moonlight: Abraham Lincoln and the Almanac Trial, By John Evangelist
Walsh, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 237, 247 n.31 (2002) ("In ... Kentucky, a lawyer
may engage in wide-open cross-examination, with the caveat that he may not
use leading questions when he departs from the scope of the direct."). The
method is referred to in Kentucky as "modified wide-open cross-
examination." Id.
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self-incrimination as to questions concerning pending criminal
charges unrelated to the case on trial." 129 In an unpublished
opinion, the California Court of Appeals, relying heavily on
New York authority, remarked:
[A]llowing the prosecution to impeach a defendant testifying
in his or her own behalf at trial, with unrelated pending
charges "unduly prejudices defendant [both] by its potential
impact on the pending criminal charge and in its actual effect
on the charge being tried. It exerts an undeniable chilling
effect upon a real 'choice' whether to testify in one's own
behalf" o
Georgia courts have recognized that the statutory right to a
thorough and sifting cross-examination is not without limits,
even when it comes to criminal defendants. 131
d. Georgia Derivations: Inconsistencies Spawned by Georgia
Rule 611(b)
Up until 2013, vintage Georgia law was premised on the
proposition that there could be no "partial waiver" of the Fifth
Amendment. Under most of the older cases, if the privilege was
waived as to one issue, it was waived as to all. 132
The ban on partial waiver seems to have been destroyed by
the 2013 adoption of O.C.G.A. § 24-1-104(d). That statute
boldly declares that an accused who testifies to one issue can
retain silence as to other topics.133 Cross-examination cannot
breach the partial silence. True enough, the doctrine is
embraced in the Georgia rules in the context of pretrial
proceedings. However, logic and consistency would seem to
extend the same principle to trials.
That is what federal law does. First, the accused does not, by
testifying upon a preliminary matter, become subject to cross-
129. People v. Smith, 665 N.E.2d 138, 140 (1996).
130. People v. Matz, 68 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1231 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(citations omitted), not certifiedfor publication.
131. King v. State, 539 S.E.2d 783, 799 (Ga. 2000); Kolokouris v. State,
523 S.E.2d 311, 315 (Ga. 1999).
132. Carter v. State, 288 S.E.2d 749, 751 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
133. O.C.G.A. § 41-1-101(d) (West, Westlaw through 2014).
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examination regarding guilt or innocence on the main charge.
This is Federal Evidence Rule 104(d). Internal consistency is
then provided by Federal Evidence Rule 611(b), which also
protects the accused from unrelated cross-examination, this time
at trial.
To the contrary, the new Georgia rules embrace a serious
inconsistency. Georgia's O.C.G.A. § 104(d) recognizes partial
waiver of defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. O.C.G.A. §
611(b) does not.
e. Severance
Some might opine that many of the cases covered by this
Article could easily be cured by severance. They say that where
an accused wishes to testify regarding one count in the charges
against him but not another, simply sever the charges and have
two trials. Such an observation lacks real world experience.
One does not simply snap fingers and achieve severance. Cases
denying severance are legion; it is very difficult to secure.134
Federal courts place the burden on criminal defendants when it
comes to severing offenses.135 So do the courts of Georgia.136
134. U.S. v. Hersh, 297 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that
severance is not mandatory simply because a defendant indicates that he
wishes to testify on some counts but not on others; rather, to establish that
the joinder of charges kept him from testifying, an appellant must show that
the charges were distinct in time place, and evidence, that there was
"important" evidence that he might have offered on one set of charges but
could not, and that he had a "strong need" not to testify on the other counts);
U.S. v. Utley, 62 Fed. Appx. 833, 836 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to sever defendant's two
assault charges; where the defendant only asserted that he "may wish to
testify at trial as to one or more counts, but not as to all," there was no
suggestion that evidence was confusing or overlapping, and offenses were
not so similar as to present risk of confusion, in that they took place on
different dates at different locations, and there were different witnesses).
135. See, e.g., U.S. v. Leavitt, 878 F.2d 1329, 1340 (11th Cir. 1989) ("To
establish an abuse of discretion, the appellant must demonstrate that he was
unable to receive a fair trial and suffered compelling prejudice.") (citation
omitted); U.S. v. Knowles, 66 F.3d 1146, 1159 (11th Cir. 1995)
("'Compelling prejudice' exists where a defendant can demonstrate that
without severance, he was unable to receive a fair trial, and the trial court
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Even cases that have touched on the issue of severance in
connection with issues raised herein provide little solace to
criminal defendants.137 That is why the message of this Article
is critical to defendants and lawyers facing multi-count
indictments.
2. The Orientation of Georgia Bench and Bar: Alerting the
Judicial System to Constitutional Considerations
Significant attention was paid in this Article to the
questionable Georgia practice of wide-open cross-examination
of the accused. Will lawyers pick up on the prospect of raising
a constitutional challenge to the Georgia rule? Some may be
concerned that the Georgia statute trumps their constitutional
objection. This is not true. Recent United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence demonstrates the ease with which
constitutional considerations override conflicting local statutes.
In Davis v. Alaska, Chief Justice Burger said that the Alaska
statute which accorded confidentiality to juvenile records had to
give way to the constitutional right of confrontation.138 The
chief witness against the defendant was described as "a crucial
witness for the prosecution." 139  The witness had a juvenile
record and was on probation for burglarizing two cabins.140 The
trial court enforced the state policy of privacy of juvenile
records and blocked the defense effort to expose the juvenile
adjudication and the witness' probation.141 The Supreme Court
could afford no protection from the prejudice suffered.") (citation omitted).
136. See, e.g., Selley v. State, 514 S.E.2d 706, 708 (Ga. 1999) ("When a
defendant argues for severance based on the trial court's discretion, it is his
burden to demonstrate that severance should be granted because of one or
more discretionary concerns.").
137. U.S. v. Montes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d 771, 778 (11th Cir. 1984) ("A
defendant who presents such a claim must demonstrate that he or she has
important testimony to give on one count and strong need to refrain from
testifying on the other").
138. 415 U.S. 308, 316-319 (1974).
139. Id. at 310.
140.Id. at 310-11.
141. Id. at 311.
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ruled this state action to be unconstitutional. 14 2
Other key cases make the same point. Mississippi trial rules
excluded hearsay in the form of declarations against interest by
a witness who said he killed a homicide victim, and that
defendant Chambers did not do it.143 The confessions of guilt
by the witness were made to third persons.144 Proof of them
was rejected under the Mississippi rule that barred declarations
against penal interest made by the declarant.145 The United
States Supreme Court said the local rule impermissibly
excluded valid evidence and amounted to a violation of due
process of law.146 The conviction of defendant Chambers was
reversed. 147
A different issue was presented in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts.148 The question was whether the testimony of a
lab technician who runs a test is necessary when the test report
is offered in evidence.149 Massachusetts procedure allowed a
crime lab report as a substitute for live testimony, over a
defense objection. 5 o This procedure was invalidated when the
United States Supreme Court announced that state practice
violated the confrontation clause of the United States
Constitution. 151
Lurking in the shadows is a disruptive potential collision
between a federally protected constitutional right and a state
evidence code provision. That was certainly the case with
Crawford v. Washington,152 as a state hearsay provision fell to
142. Id. at 315.
143. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 291-93 (1973).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 293.
146. Id. at 302-03.
147. Id.
148. 557 U.S. 305 (2009). The Melendez-Diaz case was an extension of
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding the Confrontation
Clause protects defendants against state procedures which permit testimonial
statements which are untested by cross-examination).
149. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 307.
150. Id. at 308-09.
151. Id. at 329.
152. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
302 [Vol. VII
No. 21 Unconstitutionality and Cross-Examination
Sixth Amendment protections.153 Crawford's unexpected
arrival created confusion.154 By preserving wide-open cross-
examination, Georgia may be inviting the same sort of conflict
spawned by Crawford. This time a state evidence provision
potentially collides with Fifth Amendment concerns. Could
maintaining this former code provision without serious
consideration of the issues addressed in this Article lead
Georgia, and states like it, into unwanted disruptions? A salient
difference, of course, is that Crawford took the bench and bar
by surprise. The difficulties of maintaining wide-open cross-
examination of the accused have been the object of
longstanding scholarly comment.
IV. A MILITARY MODEL?
If a forward-looking wide-open jurisdiction elects to modify
its scope of cross-examination rule to reflect Fifth Amendment
values, there are options. One would be to simply adopt Federal
Evidence Rule 611(b). Another would be to craft a special rule
for criminal defendant examinations in the manner endorsed by
the military rules. These provisions were reported in Part II,
supra. The military's approach was ably remarked upon by
three distinguished commentators.
The military drafters did attempt to address the constitutional
implications of Rule 611(b) in Rule 301, a provision with no
federal counterpart. Although we will not repeat our
discussion of Rule 301 here, it is important to note that Rule
153. TRIAL HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 554-5.
154. Hon. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Returning to Confrontation Clause
Sanity; The Supreme Court (Finally) Retreats from Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming, FED. LAW., Mar. 2013, at 68 (characterizing Crawford as "one
of the most impractical decisions in recent criminal procedure history," a
case which is plaguing trial courts with confusion and overburdening
prosecutors). See also State v. Mizenko, 127 P.3d 458, 474 n.7 (Mon. 2006)
("Crawford has disrupted domestic violence prosecutions to a degree not
seen in any other area").
155. Anderson, supra note 153, at 68 ("However, in 2004, the Supreme
Court turned heel and attempted to formulate a new standard with its
Crawford decision.").
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301(e) [now 301(c)] states that, when an accused voluntarily
testifies, he waives his Fifth Amendment privilege only with
respect to those matters contained in his direct examination.
[G]overnment counsel may not expand the testimony into
related or foundational areas. Rule 301(c) also provides that
when the accused is tried for more than one offense, he may
testify about only one of those charges, and thus not waive
his protection against self-incrimination with respect to the
others. 116
V. CONCLUSION
Court decisions dictate that the proper rule for cross-
examination of accused persons is a constitutional issue and not
merely a question of good trial procedure. A rule of limited
scope seems driven by past cases. Destroyed by careful
analysis of these cases are the following myths:
1) There can be no partial waiver of Fifth Amendment
rights when an accused testifies in a criminal case.
2) O.C.G.A. § 24-6-611(b) ordains wide-open cross-
examination of witnesses and parties, and the
constitutional rights of the accused are inferior to the
Georgia statute.
With these myths destroyed, a final conclusion is needed.
How should the justice system respond to the principles
explored in this Article? One solution may be for legislative
attention to the wide-open rule, excepting the accused from its
sweep. In the preliminary stages of criminal proceedings, there
is already recognition of the doctrine of partial waiver of Fifth
Amendment rights.18 Another option would be the recognition
156. S. SALTZBURG, L. SCHINASI & D. SCHLUETER, supra note 73, at §
611.02 [3][b] (2011) (emphasis in original).
157. Ronald L. Carlson, Scope of Cross-Examination and the Proposed
Federal Rules, 32 FED. B.J. 244, 254 (1973).
158. Under O.C.G.A. § 24-1-104(d) the privilege of silence protects
against wide-open cross of the accused. O.C.G.A. § 24-1-104(d) (West,
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of principles explained in this Article by judicial fiat, and
imposition of a new design.
The issue has national implications. In addition to Georgia,
at least one-fifth of the states expose accused persons to wide-
open cross-examination once they take the stand. Jurisdictions
which earlier rejected the federal rule and instead placed wide-
open cross-examination of the accused in their evidence codes
need to review their options.
Westlaw through 2014)
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